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THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION’S
ENERGY CURTAILMENT PROBLEM: AN ANALYSIS OF
ITS REDISPATCH POLICY AND OVERSUPPLY
PROTOCOL P AND THEIR IMPACT ON
WASHINGTON’S WIND POWER PRODUCERS, UTILITY
COMPANIES, AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE ACT
Drew Pearsall
Abstract: The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is the primary
transmitter of power in the Pacific Northwest. Charged with operating the
federal dams on the Columbia River, the BPA also maintains and operates
15,000 miles of high-voltage power lines that transmit power produced by
federal and non-federal power sources alike. Under federal law, the BPA must
accept onto its transmission system power from non-federal sources in a manner
that is fair, non-preferential, and does not discriminate against non-federal
sources. Recently, strong snowpack and periods of heavy runoff have stressed
the Federal Columbia River Power System and has led to a problem: the overgeneration of hydropower for which there is not enough capacity on the
transmission system. Compounding this problem is the fact that wind power
generation has greatly increased in the Pacific Northwest over the past decade,
with no sign of significantly slowing down. The over-generation of power, in
conjunction with the BPA’s statutory mandate to accept non-federal power
sources, has created a challenge for the BPA: to maintain the reliability of its
stressed power transmission system while fulfilling its obligation to accept, in a
fair and non-discriminatory manner, power from both federal and non-federal
sources.
In an attempt to accomplish this task, the BPA began implementing a
curtailment policy beginning in 2011 that, according to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, unlawfully discriminated against non-federal wind
power producers. The BPA has since revised and updated its displacement
policy; nevertheless, the BPA’s policies continue to unfairly discriminate against
wind power producers by placing a preference on the generation and
transmission of federal hydropower at the expense of non-federal wind power.
Not only do these policies violate the BPA’s statutory obligations and
requirements of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, but they also hurt
the ability for utility companies in Washington to meet obligations to diversify
energy portfolios as required by the Washington Energy Independence Act.
Because wind power is the dominant renewable energy resource available to
satisfy Washington’s new renewable portfolio standards (RPS), its curtailment is
problematic for utility companies and consumers alike. This Comment evaluates
the BPA’s past and existing curtailment polices, their impact on the ability to
satisfy the goals of the Washington Energy Independence Act, and the ability for
utility companies in Washington to meet RPS requirements.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Pacific Northwest has long had access to cheap power,
primarily because of the abundant hydropower generated from
the many dams built on the Columbia River and its
tributaries. However, in November 2006, Washington State
voters approved Initiative 937, requiring utility companies to
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obtain eligible renewable energy resources in order to meet
specific percentages of their electrical load capacity. 1 Codified
as the Energy Independence Act, the definitions and language
of the statute effectively preclude hydropower generated by
dams on the Columbia River and some of its tributaries from
qualifying as an eligible renewable energy resource. 2 This was
purposeful, as hydropower accounts for over seventy percent of
the electricity generated in Washington, and the State wanted
to diversify its renewable energy resources. 3 In order for
electric utilities to meet the requirements of the Energy
Independence Act to include renewable energy resources
within their portfolios, they must look to qualifying resources
as defined in the Energy Independence Act. 4 At present, the
most prominent of these alternative renewable resources is
wind energy. 5
The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the major
source of power generation and transmission in the Pacific
Northwest, impacts the ability for Washington utilities to meet
their renewable energy quotas. By operating more than 15,000
miles of transmission lines in the Pacific Northwest—
equivalent to seventy-five percent of the transmission service
in the region—the BPA effectively controls the distribution of
power in Washington. 6 However, as a major generator of
hydropower the BPA uses most of the transmission system’s
capacity to distribute its own power, leaving little room for
additional alternative energy resources to connect to its
system. 7 Thus, without major upgrades to the BPA’s

1. See Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, Initiative 937 (2006) available at
http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i937.pdf.
2. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030 (2012); BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., ISSUE
BRIEF: INITIATIVE I-937 WASHINGTON STATE CLEAN AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 2, (2006)
[hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF]; TODD MYERS, Washington Policy Center: A Guide to
Initiative 937 Washington Green Energy Quotas 4–5 (2006).
3. MYERS, supra note 2, at 4–5. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(10), (18) (2012).
5. See id. § 19.285.030 (2012); MYERS, supra note 2, at 5.
6. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–3949, SERVING THE PEOPLE OF THE
NORTHWEST 3–5 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter SERVING THE PEOPLE]; BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., DOE/BP–4280, 2010 BPA FACTS 1–2 (2011), on file with Journal.
7. See Complaint and Petition for Order Under Fed. Power Act Section 211A Against
Bonneville Power Admin. Requesting Fast Track Processing at 12–14, Iberdrola
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transmission system the ability of existing and future
alternative energy resources to reliably integrate their power
into the system is limited. 8
In 2011, the BPA implemented its Environmental
Redispatch and Negative Pricing Policies (Redispatch Policy), a
curtailment policy that limited the transmission of wind power
across the BPA’s transmission system. 9 The BPA implemented
this policy for many reasons, including: (1) to ease the strain
placed on the transmission system caused by excess
hydropower generation during periods when Columbia River
flows are exceptionally high; (2) to allow the BPA to place this
excess hydropower generation onto its transmission system; (3)
to ensure the BPA’s compliance with the Endangered Species
Act by avoiding harm to fish species; and (4) to maintain
reliable power transmission across its system. 10 FERC
determined in December 2011 that the curtailment of wind
power under the BPA’s Redispatch Policy was unduly
discriminatory and demanded that the BPA stop. 11
In response, the BPA issued a new curtailment policy
entitled “Oversupply Management Protocol Attachment P”
(Oversupply Protocol P). 12 Oversupply Protocol P fails to
satisfy the concerns expressed by FERC as it continues to
curtail the production and transmission of wind power in an
unfair and discriminatory manner. In turn, this practice
threatens the ability for some utilities to meet the renewable
portfolio standards defined in the Energy Independence Act. 13

Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-000 (Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint]; BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., DOE/BP–4288, BPA’S INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REDISPATCH AND NEGATIVE
PRICING POLICIES: ADMINISTRATOR’S FINAL RECORD OF DECISION 7–9, 11 (2011)
[hereinafter REDISPATCH POLICY].
8. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/EIS–0422, CENTRAL FERRY-LOWER
MONUMENTAL 500-KILOVOLT TRANSMISSION LINE PROJECT: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT S1–S2 (2010) (discussing lack of transmission capacity for new
wind projects developed in southeast Washington).
9. See generally REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7.
10. Id. at 1, 7.
11. Order Granting Petition, 137 FERC ¶ 61,185 (2011).
12. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF: OVERSUPPLY
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL ATTACHMENT P (2012) [hereinafter OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL
P].
13. See generally Complaint, supra note 7.
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Thus, the BPA’s current energy curtailment policy, as defined
in its Oversupply Protocol P, continues to have adverse
ramifications for wind power producers, Washington utility
companies, and the achievement of the goals articulated in the
Energy Independence Act.
This Comment will evaluate the legal and policy
implications that the BPA’s wind curtailment policies have on
(1) wind power generation in Washington, (2) the ability of
Washington utilities to obtain sufficient eligible renewable
resources necessary to meet the renewable portfolio standards
codified in the Energy Independence Act, and (3) the prospects
of reaching certain goals identified in the Energy
Independence Act, which are affected by these policies. After
evaluating these issues, this Comment will provide a series of
recommendations to replace the BPA’s current curtailment
policy aimed at: addressing the BPA’s power oversupply
problem, minimizing adverse impacts to wind power producers
and utility companies caused by curtailment, and creating a
policy moving forward that is aligned with the goals
articulated in the Energy Independence Act.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

To understand the impacts that the BPA’s current
curtailment policy has on wind power producers, utility
companies, and the achievement of goals articulated in the
Energy Independence Act, it is necessary to consider
background information regarding the BPA, its prior
Redispatch Policy, and Washington’s Energy Independence
Act.
A.

The Bonneville Power Administration

In the early twentieth century, a series of dams were built
on the Columbia River and its tributaries to prevent flooding,
increase the river’s navigability, expand irrigation capacity to
rural areas, and to harness the river’s power to provide cheap
electricity to the people and industries of the Pacific
Northwest. 14 Various federal agencies built these dams,
14. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 2–3
(2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM].
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including the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of
Engineers, 15 but the BPA was tasked with coordinating
operations amongst the dams and balancing the electrical
output generated by the waters of the Columbia River. 16
Originally created in 1937 to market the electricity generated
from the first two large dams built on the river (Grand Coulee
and Bonneville), the BPA eventually took control of marketing
the power generated from all the dams on the Columbia River
with the signing of the Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement and enactment of the Federal Columbia River
Transmission System Act. 17
The area in which the BPA markets power is commonly
referred to as the Federal Columbia River Power System
(FCRPS). 18 Within the FCRPS, the BPA controls facilities that
generate power including: thirty-one federal dams, one nonfederal nuclear power plant at Hanford, and several wind
projects. 19 In addition, the BPA maintains more than 15,000
miles of power transmission lines throughout its service
territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western
Montana and parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada,
Utah, and Wyoming. 20 The transmission grid operated by the
BPA “links virtually all utilities in the Northwest,” including
15. Id. at 2.
16. See Bonneville Project Act of 1937 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (2006); Federal Columbia
River Transmission System Act of 1974 § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 838(a), (d), (f) (2006)
(making the BPA sole marketing authority of federal generated power on the Federal
Columbia River Power System and making it a self-funding agency). The BPA was
created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 and housed in the Department of the
Interior. However, control over the BPA was transferred to the Department of Energy
when it was created in 1977, which is where it still resides, albeit as a self-funding
entity that pays for its operations through the sale and transmission of electricity. See
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–3818, 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS 1–
8 (2007) [hereinafter 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS].
17. 16 U.S.C. § 838(f) (2006); see also 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS, supra
note 16, at 2.
18. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 2.
19. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–4224: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. Currently, there are thirty-two completed wind
projects integrated to BPA’s transmission system, nine ongoing projects that have yet
to be completed, and twenty-five proposed projects that, if built, will be integrated into
the transmission system. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA WIND MAP 2012,
TRANSMISSION
SERVICES,
WIND
PROJECTS
(2012),
available
at
http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/documents/BPA_wind_map_2012.pdf.
20. See SERVING THE PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 3–5.
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those that generate their own power, but still rely on the
“BPA’s [transmission] system rather than building their own
transmission lines.” 21 Together, the BPA’s generation and
transmission services create its Balancing Authority Area in
which the BPA must ensure that there is a balance between
electricity generated and transmission capacity for this
power. 22
Maintaining transmission system reliability is just one of
many obligations that the BPA must juggle in its attempt to
satisfy all of its statutory and court-ordered duties. Important
to this Comment, however, are the statutory obligations that
define how the BPA generates and transmits power within its
Balancing Authority Area. These obligations can be
categorized as environmental responsibilities and statutory
The
first
category—environmental
responsibilities. 23
responsibilities—requires the BPA to comply with the
Endangered Species Act, as endangered fish species exist in
the Columbia River. These species are affected by the BPA’s
decision to either run water through its power generating
turbines or spill it over the top of the dams. 24
The second category—statutory responsibilities—requires
the BPA to comply with legal mandates set forth in its
authorizing statues, such as the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, the Pacific Northwest
Power Preference Act, the Bonneville Project Act, the Federal
Columbia River Transmission System Act, the Federal Power
Act, and legal orders given by FERC. 25 Collectively, these
mandates require the BPA to consider energy conservation and
the equitable treatment of fish and wildlife top priorities; 26
give Northwest utilities and customers preference in the
acquisition of power; 27 control how the BPA generates,
transmits, and exchanges power, including excess federal

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 4.
REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7.
Id. at 1.
See FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 5–7;
REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–7.
25. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 1.
26. FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 4.
27. SERVING THE PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 3.
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power; 28 describe the conditions that must be satisfied to allow
interconnection of non-federal sources to its transmission
grid; 29 and ensure that the BPA provides open, fair and
nondiscriminatory access to non-federal power generators
connecting to its transmission system. 30
The BPA’s environmental and statutory responsibilities
provide the framework within which the BPA must operate its
power generation and transmission services. Although
protecting endangered fish species is a top priority, the BPA
cannot neglect or ignore its other responsibilities.31 The BPA
recognizes this dilemma, but does not give a clear indication of
any existing hierarchy that prioritizes its obligations or
coordinates the multiple objectives created by this array of
laws. 32 Instead, it appears that the BPA utilizes the bevy of
controlling laws to its advantage by arguing that certain
responsibilities require action and trump other obligations
when such arguments benefit the BPA’s operation of the
FCRPS. 33
B.

The BPA’s Curtailment Policies

As a federal agency housed in the Department of Energy,
the BPA has multiple statutory obligations it must follow in
operating the FCRPS. Although all of its obligations are
important, the three statutory requirements that most concern
the BPA in regard to marketing hydropower throughout the
FCRPS are: (1) to maintain an adequate, efficient, economical,
and reliable energy supply; (2) to operate a transmission
system that provides open access to non-federal energy sources
that is sufficient to integrate and transmit power from federal
and non-federal power generators; and (3) to mitigate the
28. See generally Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C §§ 832a–832m (2006);
Pacific Northwest Consumer Power Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 837a–837g (2006).
29. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i–824k (1920), amended by 16 U.S.C. § 839d1 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. § 3505 (2006).
30. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Dep’t of Energy, Rules and Regulations, Order
No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (1996).
31. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 16–18.
32. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 1–7.
33. See, e.g., id. at 5–6, 26–27; 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 21, 45.
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impact that dam operations have on fish and wildlife by
complying with the Endangered Species Act. 34 In order to
fulfill these statutory obligations, the BPA maintains that it
has discretion in operating its power generation and
transmission systems. 35
For years, the BPA has been forced to deal with periods of
over-generation of hydropower. 36 When this occurs—often
because of heavy rains, runoff from large snow pack, or flood
events caused by the fast dissipation of snowpack—the BPA
runs excess water through dam turbines which increases the
amount of hydropower entering the power transmission grid. 37
This affects the BPA’s ability to reliably transmit power as the
additional hydropower stresses the system, causing overloads
and potential outages. 38 As high water flows have occurred
with greater frequency in recent years, stresses to the
transmission system have become even more problematic.39
Compounding this problem is the Endangered Species Act
protections of fish found in the Columbia River. This, according
to the BPA, requires water to be run through dam turbines as
opposed to spilling it over the dams, so as to avoid an increase
in Total Dissolved Gas (TDG) levels.40 TDG levels, which are
regulated by the state, can be dangerous or fatal to fish if too
high. 41 Thus, running the excess water through turbines
avoids increasing TDG to dangerous levels, but also generates
34. Redispatch Policy, supra note 7, at 1, 5–7; BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–
4280, 2010 BPA FACTS 1–2 (2011), on file with Journal.
35. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
36. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7, 10.
37. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION’S DRAFT
OVERSUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL: A NARRATIVE EXPLANATION 1 (2012)
[hereinafter BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION]; REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–
7.
38. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 9–10.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 5–7.
41. Id. Some groups contest this claim, believing that current TDG levels the BPA
uses to determine when to run excess water through its turbines are too low and
instead, increased spillage would actually benefit endangered fish species. See Protest
of and Comments on Respondent’s Compliance Filing by Save Our Wild Salmon,
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Institute for Fisheries
Resources, Idaho Rivers United, and American Rivers at 4–6, Iberdrola Renewables,
Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-002 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Salmon Protest].
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additional hydropower. 42
In the past, this excess hydropower generated during high
water flows was less problematic because there was sufficient
capacity on the BPA’s transmission system to accommodate
the increased generation. 43 However, in recent years, a boom
in wind power generation and its subsequent integration onto
the BPA’s transmission system has stressed the transmission
grid. 44 Thus, there is not sufficient capacity on the
transmission system for the excess hydropower generated
during high water events, which can last anywhere from a few
days to more than a month, 45 and existing wind power
connected to the BPA’s system. 46 In order to accommodate the
increased hydropower entering the transmission grid, the BPA
reduces the amount of wind power it transmits on its system. 47
Otherwise, the BPA claims that it would not be able to satisfy
its statutory mandates to maintain transmission reliability,
keep costs to its consumers low by not paying for wasted power
generation, and comply with regulations protecting
endangered fish species. 48
To satisfy these obligations, the BPA implemented its
Environmental Redispatch and Negative Pricing Policy
(Redispatch Policy) in 2011, which mandated that other
sources of energy connected to the BPA’s transmission system
be shut down when excess hydropower was generated. 49 The
Redispatch Policy was designed to:
Ensure BPA is taking all reasonable efforts to meet its
legal responsibilities under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), and court
order[s] (collectively, “environmental responsibilities),
as well as BPA’s legal obligations under its authorizing

42. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–7.
43. Id. at 7, 9–10
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10, 16. In its Redispatch Policy, the BPA admits that high flow events
large enough to trigger redispatch are not rare on the Columbia River. In fact, there is
a one in three chance of their occurrence, which may last for one month or more. Id. at
10.
46. Id. at 9–10.
47. Id. at 14–15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 15, 19.
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legislation, such as the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act (“Northwest
Power Act”), the Federal Columbia River Transmission
System Act (“Transmission System Act”), the Pacific
Northwest Power Preference Act (“Preference Act”), and
the Bonneville Project Act (collectively, “statutory
responsibilities”), under specific hydro and load
conditions, and after all reasonably practicable
mitigating measures have been implemented. In
addition, Environmental Redispatch will help provide
options for BPA to maintain system reliability by
balancing loads and resources within BPA’s Balancing
Authority Area while meeting BPA’s environmental and
statutory responsibilities. 50
In practice, the BPA’s Redispatch Policy forced wind power
producers placing power onto the BPA’s transmission system
to stop generating and transmitting power so that the BPA
could utilize that transmission capacity for the distribution of
its own excess hydropower. 51
This curtailment policy was problematic from the outset and
was immediately challenged by wind power groups throughout
the Pacific Northwest. 52 In June 2011, a lawsuit was filed with
FERC alleging that the BPA’s Redispatch Policy provided
unfair access to its transmission system and thus was unduly
discriminatory in violation of the Federal Power Act and FERC
Orders Nos. 888 and 890. 53 FERC ultimately determined that
the Redispatch Policy “significantly diminishes open access to
transmission, and results in Bonneville providing transmission
service to others on terms and conditions that are not
comparable to those it provides itself.” 54 FERC required the
BPA to file a policy “providing for transmission service on
terms and conditions that are comparable to those under

50. Id. at 1.
51. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 4–6. See also Ted Sickinger, BPA
Braces for Strong Spring Runoff, Excess Power and Wind Power Cuts, OREGONLIVE
(Apr. 7, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/print.html
?entry=/2012/04/wind_farms_bpa_brace_for_power.html (discussing impact to wind
power producers during actual curtailment event).
52. See generally Complaint, supra note 7.
53. See id. at 2–7.
54. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 33.
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which Bonneville provides to itself and that are not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.” 55
In an attempt to comply with the terms and conditions set
forth in FERC’s order, the BPA created Oversupply Protocol P
and submitted it to FERC. 56 However, Oversupply Protocol P
is not a satisfactory response to the problems FERC identified
with the BPA’s energy curtailment program. Instead, the
BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P is a continuation of the defunct
Redispatch Policy that continues to: (1) unfairly and
unnecessarily discriminate against the wind power industry,
(2) inhibit utility companies from obtaining the eligible
renewable resources necessary to meet Washington’s
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) targets, and (3) negatively
impact the State’s ability to achieve the goals set forth in the
Energy Independence Act.
C.

Washington’s Energy Independence Act

Washington’s Energy Independence Act was enacted in 2007
and codified the renewable portfolio standards passed by
voters, who approved Initiative 937 on November 7, 2006. 57 By
its very nature, the Energy Independence Act is considered a
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) since it requires electricity
retailers to “acquire a minimum percentage of their power
from renewable energy resources.” 58 The Energy Independence
Act is one of the nation’s most stringent and requires
qualifying utilities—those serving 25,000 or more customers—
to have “eligible renewable resources” make up three percent
of their overall electric load by January 1, 2012, nine percent of
their electric load by January 1, 2016, and fifteen percent of
their electric load by January 1, 2020. 59 As of 2009, there were

55. Id. ¶ 30.
56 See Compliance Filing of the Bonneville Power Admin. at 3–4, Iberdrola
Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-000, (Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Compliance Filing].
57. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285 (2012); Sam Reed, Wasington Secretary of State,
Initiative 937 (2006), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/
i937.pdf.
58. WILLIAM BRIDGES, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
CREDITS 1 (2010).
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a) (2012).
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seventeen qualifying utility companies in Washington, which
accounted for more than eighty percent of the State’s electric
load. 60 Some of these utilities will be affected by the BPA’s
Oversupply Protocol P differently than others, as some utilities
own their own eligible renewable resource facilities, obtain
eligible renewable resources from a transmission system not
controlled by the BPA, or have the financial capability to
purchase renewable energy credits to meet RPS targets. 61
However, because the BPA controls eighty percent of the
transmission system, many qualifying utilities will rely on the
BPA in some capacity for obtaining eligible renewable
resources. 62
RPS requirements defined in the Energy Independence Act
do not control or mandate action by the BPA, since the agency
runs a thoroughly federal, interstate structure in the FCRPS. 63
These State requirements are inherently intertwined with, and
frustrated by, the BPA’s operation of the FCRPS and its
control over the transmission system that accepts and delivers

60. UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA–0348(01)/2, WASHINGTON
ELECTRICITY PROFILE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: TABLE 10—CLASS OF OWNERSHIP,
NUMBER OF CONSUMERS, SALES, REVENUES, AND AVERAGE RETAIL PRICE BY STATE AND
UTILITY (Apr. 2011), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/washington.html
[hereinafter QUALIFYING WASHINGTON UTILITIES]; see also DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, WASHINGTON: INCENTIVES/POLICIES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=WA15R [hereinafter STATE INCENTIVES] (stating that
the seventeen qualifying utilities in Washington account for eighty-four percent of the
State’s electric load).
61. See, e.g., AVISTA, INVESTOR-OWNED AND PUBLIC UTILITIES (2011); Order
Regarding 2012 Renewable Energy Target, In the Matter of Avista Corporation’s
Renewable Energy Target Progress Report Under RCW 19.285.070 and WAC 480-109040, Docket UE-120791, at 9 (Wash. Util. and Transp. Comm’n, Sept. 13, 2012).
62. See, e.g., AVISTA, 2011 ELECTRIC INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 5-1 to 5-5 (2011)
(discussing the need to still rely on the BPA for certain transmission capacity even
though Avista owns its own generating facilities and transmission system); CLARK
COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITIES, FINAL INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 9, 46–49, 63–65, 74–75
(2010) (discussing Clark County’s reliance on the BPA for meeting most of its energy
needs, including obtaining eligible renewable resources necessary to meet future RPS
targets). Integrated Resource Plans are invaluable to understanding the energy needs
of the seventeen qualifying utilities. Each qualifying utility has an Integrated
Resource Plan. These documents identify how the utility obtains its energy, what its
energy demands are, projections for meeting RPS targets, and describe challenges to
obtaining these resources, especially as targets increase to nine percent of total load in
2016 and fifteen percent of total load in 2020.
63. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48.
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seventy-five percent of the Pacific Northwest’s power. 64 The
BPA is required to provide open, fair, and nondiscriminatory
access to its transmission system under federal law, and
cannot promote its own hydropower generation over nonfederal power generation, including private wind power
projects throughout Washington. 65 Nevertheless, the BPA’s
curtailment policies do not provide open access to non-federal
wind power producers. 66 This frustrates the ability for
Washington utilities to obtain the eligible renewable resources
necessary to satisfy the requirements set forth in the Energy
Independence Act. Although Washington’s RPS requirements
do not have any legal effect on the BPA, compliance with
FERC’s open access transmission tariff would help utility
companies meet state-mandated RPS targets by providing
them better access to a greater amount of eligible renewable
resources on the BPA controlled transmission system.
The Energy Independence Act outlines various options
qualifying utilities may follow in order to comply with RPS
targets. Two backdoor compliance methods articulated in the
statute involve utilities: (1) investing four percent of their total
annual retail revenue on the incremental costs of eligible
renewable resources, the cost of purchasing renewable energy
credits (RECs), or a combination of both; 67 or (2) satisfying
three specific requirements, which entail maintaining electric
load levels for a three year period, not commencing or
renewing purchases of electricity from sources other than
renewable resources, and investing one percent of total annual
revenue on eligible renewable resources, RECs, or a
combination of both. 68 The ability of utility companies to
comply with RPS requirements using these methods is difficult
to determine, as is ascertaining the potential pitfalls or
benefits of these procedures.

64. See id. at 48, 64–65.
65. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 32–33, 62–65.
66. Id. ¶ 62.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.050(1)(a) (2012). Under the Energy Independence
Act, a REC refers to a “tradable certificate of proof of at least one megawatt-hour of an
eligible renewable resource where the generation facility is not powered by
freshwater. . . . and the certificate is verified by a renewable energy credit tracking
system . . . .” Id. § 19.285.030(19).
68. See id. § 19.285.040(2)(d).
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A more conventional way for utility companies to comply
with RPS requirements is to directly acquire eligible
renewable resources, their equivalent RECs, or a combination
of both to meet the annual targets for the years 2012, 2016,
and 2020. 69 Under this provision, a utility may obtain power
directly from actual eligible renewable resources or may
purchase eligible RECs, which are certificates sold in regulated
markets representing power generated from an eligible
renewable resource not directly transmitted to a consumer. 70
These certificates serve two purposes. First, they allow for
increased production of renewable energy, which can then be
traded or sold for profit, and second, they provide an
alternative method for utility companies to meet RPS
requirements.
A final way to comply with the Energy Independence Act’s
RPS requirements exists for utility companies that cannot
obtain enough eligible renewable resources due to “events
beyond the reasonable control of the utility that could not have
been reasonably anticipated or ameliorated.” 71 Events
contemplated under this noncompliance defense include
“weather-related damage, mechanical failure, strikes, lockouts,
and actions of a governmental authority that adversely affect
the generation, transmission, or distribution of an eligible
renewable resource under contract to a qualifying utility.” 72 At
first glance, this section appears to exempt utility companies
affected by the BPA’s curtailment policies from complying with
Washington’s RPS obligations; however, it can be argued that
the Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P place utility
companies on notice of events that may affect the distribution
of eligible renewable resources. Thus, the utility companies
will not meet the requirements of the statutory exemption
because they can reasonably anticipate these events and
attempt to ameliorate them. If this argument fails, and instead
a utility could achieve RPS compliance without actually
obtaining eligible renewable resources, then the goals of the

69. Id. § 19.285.040(2)(a).
70. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 541
(West Nutshell Series ed., 2d ed. 2011).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(i) (2012).
72. Id.
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Energy Independence Act cannot be met. In that situation, the
BPA’s curtailment policies would essentially make the Energy
Independence Act ineffective and void, contradicting the clear
intent of the citizens of Washington who voted to implement
RPS targets by passing Initiative 937 in November 2006.
As defined in the Energy Independence Act, eligible
renewable resources mean “electricity from a generation
facility powered by a renewable resource other than freshwater
that commences operation after March 31, 1999,” so long as
the generating facility is located in the Pacific Northwest or
the power is delivered to Washington on a real time basis. 73 In
addition, an eligible renewable resource can mean
“incremental electricity produced as a result of efficiency
improvements completed after March 31, 1999, to hydroelectric
generation projects owned by a qualifying utility,” or to
hydroelectric generation in irrigation pipes and canals located
in the Pacific Northwest, “where the additional generation in
either case does not result in new water diversions or
impoundments.” 74
Under the Energy Independence Act, and as recognized by
the BPA itself, hydropower generated at dams within FCRPS
does not qualify as an eligible renewable resource; wind power,
on the other hand, is a qualifying resource. 75 The definition
purposefully excludes hydropower generated at dams operated
by the BPA, which already accounts for seventy percent of all
power generated in Washington.76 Otherwise, the abundance
of hydropower in Washington would hurt the State’s ability to
achieve goals articulated in the Energy Independence Act by
stymieing the development and diversification of alternative
renewable resources in the State, reducing the development of
green business and clean technologies in the State, and
reducing economic opportunities for Washington counties and
farmers. 77
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(11)(a) (2012).
74. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(b).
75. See id. § 19.285.030; ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 2.
76. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that eighty percent of BPA
electricity comes from hydropower); MYERS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that as of 2004,
seventy percent of all energy generated in Washington comes from hydro sources).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012). The Energy Independence Act identifies
the following as important goals: promote energy independence in Washington; utilize
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Unlike the BPA-generated hydropower, wind power qualifies
as an eligible renewable resource as defined by the Energy
Independence Act. 78 In Washington, wind power accounts for
nearly seventy-one percent of eligible renewable resource
generation. 79 This percentage is likely to increase as wind
turbines, both inland and on the coast, continue to be built. In
fact, wind power in Washington currently generates around
2400 megawatts of electricity—enough energy to power
625,000 homes for a year—with 343 additional megawatts
under construction, and future facilities in the project queue
that will generate an additional 5800 megawatts of
electricity. 80 Furthermore, future projections indicate that a
total of 18,479 megawatts of wind power could be produced in
Washington. 81 As the largest eligible renewable resource, wind
power producers are hurt by the BPA’s curtailment policies
(e.g. Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P) that restrict
access to its transmission system. The reduction in wind power
caused by curtailment, significant or not, impacts the ability of
utility companies to acquire the eligible renewable resources
necessary to meet Washington’s RPS targets.
In addition to RPS targets and specific renewable resource
mandates, the Energy Independence Act establishes specific
policy goals tied to the development of renewable resources,
including obtaining energy independence within Washington
State by utilizing the region’s diverse local resources, providing
economic benefits to counties and farms, creating high-quality

local resources; provide economic benefits to Washington counties and farmers; create
high quality, local jobs; provide opportunities within the renewable energy fields; and
position Washington as a national leader in clean energy technologies.
78. See id. § 19.285.030(20) (defining “renewable resource”); id. § 19.285.030(11)(a)
(defining “eligible renewable resource”).
79. See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE & ALTERNATIVE FUELS,
WASHINGTON RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PROFILE: 2009 SUMMARY RENEWABLE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY STATISTICS (WASHINGTON) TABLE 1 (Jul. 2011),
http://www.eia.gov/renewable/state/Washington/pdf/washington.pdf
[hereinafter
WASHINGTON RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PROFILE]. It is important to remind the reader
that hydropower, for all intents and purposes, is not an eligible renewable resource
under the Energy Independence Act. The “seventy-one percent” number expressed in
the text represents the percentage of wind power as calculated against all other
eligible renewable energy resources.
80. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND ENERGY FACTS: WASHINGTON 1 (2011).
81. Id.
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local jobs, and establishing Washington as a leader in clean
energy technologies. 82 The Energy Independence Act promotes
these goals in two ways. First, the Act excludes the vast
majority of hydropower from qualifying as an eligible
renewable resource. 83 Second, it requires Washington utilities
to obtain the eligible renewable resources necessary to satisfy
RPS requirements from generating facilities within
Washington or from out-of-state facilities that deliver power to
the utility on a real time basis. 84 These two requirements help
achieve the policy goals articulated in the Energy
Independence Act by diversifying the State’s renewable
resources, developing alternative renewable resources, and by
promoting economic growth through the development of green
industry and technology within the State. An effective way to
turn these goals into a reality is by continuing to promote,
develop, and invest in wind power.
The continued development of wind power will help fulfill
the Energy Independence Act’s stated goal of creating energy
independence in Washington using a local, clean, renewable
energy resource. 85 Just as important, developing wind power
helps satisfy the economic goals articulated in the Energy
Independence Act, as it is a direct investment in jobs. 86 The
economic benefits of wind power are twofold. First, in addition
to the jobs required for the development of the transmission
system necessary to integrate and deliver the wind power to
consumers, 87 it creates jobs at all stages of development—the
manufacture, construction, maintenance, and operation of the
turbines and wind facilities. 88 Second, it provides economic
support to farmers who receive payments for leasing the land
on which the wind facilities are often built and to rural
counties whose tax revenues increase through the influx of

82. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012)
83. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(a)–(b).
84. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(a).
85 See Sierra Club 2012 Legislative Priorities for Washington, SIERRA CLUB:
WASHINGTON STATE CHAPTER, http://cascade.sierraclub.org/priorities/legislation (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013).
86. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2.
87. Id.
88. See id.
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activity experienced by local businesses. 89 In 2010 alone, wind
power supported up to 2000 jobs in Washington, generating
over $13,500,000 in tax payments by project owners and over
$6,500,000 in lease payments to land owners. 90
As indicated, the Energy Independence Act promotes
renewable resource development, economic development, and
energy independence within Washington. It accomplishes
these goals through the implementation of its RPS targets,
which currently apply to seventeen qualifying utilities in the
State. 91 To comply with this mandate and work towards
achieving the policy goals of the Energy Independence Act, the
seventeen qualifying utility companies must have reliable
access to eligible renewable resources, especially wind power.
Reliable access is currently thwarted by the BPA’s curtailment
policies, specifically its Oversupply Protocol P, a mere
continuation of its Redispatch Policy condemned by FERC. 92
III. THE BPA’S CURTAILMENT POLICY: OVERSUPPLY
PROTOCOL P
On December 7, 2011, FERC issued an order requiring the
BPA to provide power transmission service on “terms and
conditions that are comparable to those under which
Bonneville provides transmission services to itself and that are
not unduly discriminatory or preferential.”93 In response to
this order, the BPA created its Oversupply Protocol P in an
attempt to satisfy FERC’s requirement that the BPA provide
fair, non-discriminatory access to the transmission system it

89. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2; see also Anne Mulkern, Renewable
Energy: Wind is the New Cash Crop in Rural Wash. Town, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/10/18/18greenwire-wind-is-the-new-cash-crop-inrural-wash-town-3529.html. Currently, large wind farms exist in rural areas of
Klickitat, Kittitas, Columbia, Walla Walla, and Garfield Counties. See AM. WIND
ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80. (In addition to increased tax revenues received by the
county, rural county businesses benefit from wind power development as workers who
construct and maintain the facilities eat at local restaurants, stay at local hotels, and
use local gas stations.).
90. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2.
91. See STATE INCENTIVES, supra note 60.
92. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 33, 62–65.
93. Id. ¶ 1.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013

19

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

98

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:1

operates. 94 Although a change from the BPA’s previous
curtailment policy (the Redispatch Policy), Oversupply
Protocol P and the Cost Allocation submitted in conjunction
with the Protocol fail to mitigate the fundamental problem
FERC identified with the BPA’s curtailment practice: the
BPA’s displacement of wind power, which results in noncomparable transmission service, is unduly discriminatory and
preferential. 95 Oversupply Protocol P is merely a continuation
of the Redispatch Policy invalidated by FERC that gives
preference to the generation and transmission of federal
hydropower over non-federal wind power. 96 Ultimately,
Oversupply Protocol P and its Cost Allocation fail to satisfy the
concerns FERC has with the BPA’s curtailment practices.97
A.

Overview of Oversupply Protocol P

Oversupply Protocol P requires the BPA to pay non-federal
wind power producers a fee when their ability to transmit
power is curtailed during high water flow events.98 Under the
policy, the BPA will take all actions it deems reasonable to
reduce or avoid the need to displace wind power and will revert
to a Least-Cost Displacement Cost Curve (Cost-Curve) in the
event that displacement must occur. 99 The Cost-Curve is a list
containing the cost of displacement for each generating facility
within the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area and is based on
information submitted by the generating facilities, which
establishes the dollar amount per megawatt-hour ($/MWh)
that a generator will lose when not producing power. 100
Oversupply Protocol P explains how the cost of displacement is
calculated, how the BPA will compensate generators for their

94. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 5.
95. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11.
96. Id.¶ 78 (“[T]he Commission finds that Bonneville’s Environmental Redispatch
Policy results in non-comparable transmission service that is unduly discriminatory
and preferential. Accordingly, Bonneville may not extend its current environmental
redispatch policies or implement new environmental redispatch policies that result in
noncomparable transmission service.”).
97. Id.
98. See generally OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12.
99. Id. ¶¶ 2–4.
100. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
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lost power, and how the agency proposes to minimize these
costs. 101
A generator’s cost of displacement ($/MWh) is limited based
on when the generator contracted for the sale of its power. For
generators with contracts executed before March 6, 2012, the
cost of displacement includes the amount of partial tax credits
(PTCs) and contracted-for RECs lost due to displacement in
addition to penalties a generator incurs for its failure to deliver
RECs. 102 If RECs have not yet been contracted for, a generator
is paid the fair market value of the potential RECs lost
because of curtailment. 103 If a generator executes a contract
after March 6, 2012, it is eligible to receive lost PTCs and
RECs, but will not be compensated for penalties incurred for
failing to deliver power under the terms of its contracts. 104 The
BPA believes that these generators can build penalty costs into
future contracts with third parties since Oversupply Protocol P
places generators on notice that the BPA will not pay these
penalty costs. 105
The BPA will, however, compensate for curtailment by
paying generators the cost of power displacement ($/MWh)
multiplied by the difference between the number of scheduled
megawatts of generation and the actual megawatts generated
during curtailment. 106 Put in mathematical terms, the BPA
will pay generators based on the following equation: $/MWh x
(Scheduled MW – Actual MW generated). In conjunction with
Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA submitted a rate case in order
to establish a rate of recovery for costs the BPA incurs under
Oversupply Protocol P, which the BPA refers to as “Cost
Allocation.” 107 The BPA has proposed to allocate fifty percent of
the costs it incurs to generators subject to curtailment and the
other fifty percent of costs it incurs to power purchases from
the Federal Base System. 108 Under the Cost Allocation terms,

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. ¶¶ 3–6.
Id. ¶ 3(a)(i)–(ii)(A).
Id. ¶ 3(a)(ii)(B).
Id. ¶ 3(b).
See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 14–15.
OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 4.
Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 21.
Id.
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the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P provides power generators
with two options to determine their compensation for
curtailment: (1) a generator may submit a cost displacement
($/MWh) figure, in which case the generator be subject to the
fifty/fifty Cost Allocation proposed by BPA; or (2) a generator
can decide to have a cost displacement ($/MWh) figure of
$0/MWh—in which case the generator will receive no
compensation for displaced power, but will not be subject to
the fifty/fifty Cost Allocation proposal. 109
Finally, the BPA will displace power in order of least cost
facility to highest cost facility as listed on the Cost-Curve, until
the necessary amount of curtailment is met. 110 In addition to
these Cost-Curve payments, the BPA will continue to replace
displaced wind power with its own federal hydropower in order
to maintain transmission schedules. 111
B.

Oversupply Protocol P Fails to Satisfy the Conditions of
FERC’s Order

FERC invalidated the BPA’s prior curtailment policy, the
Redispatch Policy, and demanded that the BPA submit a new
policy that provides access to its transmission system on a fair,
non-discriminatory and non-preferential basis. 112 Oversupply
Protocol P is the BPA’s attempt to comply with this mandate
by compensating non-federal wind power producers for the
forced curtailment of their power.113 However, this added
economic incentive fails to address the fundamental issue that
FERC has with the BPA’s curtailment practice—that it
interrupts non-federal generators’ firm transmission service
without doing the same to firm transmission service held by
federal generators, making it unfairly discriminatory and
preferential to the BPA. 114 Ultimately, it is the BPA’s
Oversupply Protocol P failure to mitigate this practice that
troubles FERC.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. at Summary ¶.
See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 33, 62–65.
BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 5.
See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 62.
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Oversupply Protocol P Fails to Fully Compensate
Curtailment Costs

Oversupply Protocol P is tied to the Cost Allocation that the
BPA submitted to FERC in conjunction with this policy. 115
Under the Cost Allocation proposal, the BPA will split the
costs it incurs to curtail wind power on a fifty-fifty basis
between its ratepayers and the generators whose energy is
forcibly displaced. 116 The BPA believes this is an equitable
solution since it allows the Administration to meet one of its
statutory obligations—to provide low-cost power to its
customers—while allocating costs between the two entities
causing the problem: the BPA, which over-generates power,
and the wind power industry whose recent growth helps create
the oversupply problem. 117 Whether correct or not, this
argument fails to adequately address FERC’s concern over the
BPA’s curtailment practice, as allocating the cost of
curtailment on a fifty-fifty basis is still unfair and
discriminatory for the following reasons.
First, the over-generation and over-supply of power is
something the BPA has dealt with for years and that existed
well before the recent boom in wind power production; thus,
too much hydropower, not wind power generation, is the
fundamental cause of the problem. 118 Because the problem
stems from an over-abundance of federal hydropower
generation, the BPA should be forced to cover all curtailment
costs. Second, although the recent increase in wind power
generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area adds
additional stress to the transmission system, the amount of
wind power generated accounts for a little more than five
percent of total statewide power generation. 119 Furthermore,

115. See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 4–7.
116. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 17; see also OVERSUPPLY
PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b) (noting that wind power producers submitting a
cost of displacement will be subject to Cost Allocation, described in BPA’S NARRATIVE
EXPLANATION, supra note 37).
117. See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 21–26.
118. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7, 9–10.
119. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT: WIND POWER BRINGING
INNOVATION, MANUFACTURING BACK TO AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Annual_Report.cfm.
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during the 2011 curtailment period (May 13, 2011 through
July 13, 2011), wind power accounted for only 8.5 percent of
the power generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area,
whereas federal hydropower accounted for eighty-nine percent
of the generated power. 120 In its response to comments
regarding Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA stated that Cost
Allocation should adhere to the principle of cost causation,
which equitably distributes costs based on each entity’s
contribution to the problem. 121 As indicated above, non-federal
wind power makes up only a fraction of the amount of power
generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area. Therefore,
wind power producers should not incur fifty percent of
curtailment costs when federal hydropower generation
accounts for close to ninety percent of the oversupply
problem. 122 Splitting curtailment costs equally discriminates
against wind power producers by placing a disproportionate
amount of the total cost on them and contradicts the BPA’s
own statements regarding equitable cost causation
principles. 123
In addition to the fact that wind power producers do not
equally contribute to the BPA’s over-generation problem,
Oversupply Protocol P discriminates against these same
entities by failing to pay them sufficiently for curtailing their
power production. Oversupply Protocol P provides non-federal
wind power producers two payment options for displacing their
power. 124 First, these entities can choose to receive no
compensation for displaced power, in which case they do not
have to participate in the BPA’s Cost Allocation proposal. 125
This payment option is discriminatory as it fails to pay wind
power producers money for the forced curtailment of their
power. In effect, this option is a replica of BPA’s Redispatch

120. Protest of Northwest Wind Group and American Wind Energy Association,
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-002, 15 (Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Wind Protest].
121. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENT ON 2012
OVERSUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 19 (rev. ed., Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter BPA’S
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS].
122. See supra notes 119 and 120.
123. BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 19.
124. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3.
125. Id.
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Policy, which FERC explicitly invalidated. 126 Second, wind
power producers can choose to receive payment for their
displaced power by submitting a cost displacement figure
($/MWh), which is primarily determined by the amount of
PTCs and RECs a generator loses during curtailment.
However, if an entity chooses to receive this payment, it must
abide by the BPA’s Cost Allocation proposal.127 This option also
discriminates against non-federal wind generators because it
fails to compensate them for the actual amount of money lost
due to curtailment. Although the BPA will pay them for lost
PTCs, RECs, and contractual penalties incurred (in certain
situations), the BPA offsets this payment by forcing wind
generators to split the costs the BPA incurs for implementing
Oversupply Protocol P, including the payments made to wind
generators for displacing their power.128
2.

The Cost-Curve Mechanism Is Discriminatory

Oversupply Protocol P also unfairly discriminates against
facilities that have low displacement costs ($/MWh). The BPA
relies on the Cost-Curve to determine which non-federal wind
power facilities will be shut down, displacing energy from
facilities with the lowest costs first.129 This practice
disproportionately impacts generators with low costs in order
to minimize the impact on the Administration’s finances. 130 In
particular, the practice discriminates against public utility
companies, which are not eligible to receive PTCs, and thus
inevitably have lower displacement costs than generators that
are eligible for PTCs. 131 Based on the Cost-Curve, these
entities will be shut down more frequently than wind power
facilities receiving PTCs. 132 Finally, the Cost-Curve
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78.
OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶¶ 3(b), 3(c)(i).
Id. ¶ 3(b).
Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
See Wind Protest, supra note 120, at 13.
Renewable Energy Tax Credits, THE BOTTOM LINE ON RENEWABLE ENERGY TAX
CREDITS (WORLD RES. INST., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2010, at 1, available at
http://pdf.wri.org/bottom_line_renewable_energy_tax_credits_10-2010.pdf.
132. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 4 (because public utilities do
not receive PTCs, they will have lower costs of displacement and so will be first on the
Cost Curve).
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mechanism is facially preferential towards the BPA as it only
applies to non-federal power generators. Thus, the BPA’s
hydropower operations are not subject to curtailment.133 As
ordered by FERC, the BPA is not allowed to “implement new
redispatch policies that result in non-comparable transmission
service” between it and non-federal power sources.134 However,
this is exactly what the Cost-Curve mechanism does, showing
that the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P fails to satisfy FERC’s
order.
3.

Generators with Contracts Executed After March 6, 2012
Are at a Competitive Disadvantage

In addition to discriminating against wind power producers
with low displacement costs, Oversupply Protocol P further
discriminates against all non-federal wind power producers
with transmission contracts executed after March 6, 2012.
Under Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA will compensate these
generators only for PTCs and RECs lost during displacement
and not for penalties that generator might incur for its failure
to deliver power to a third-party. 135 The BPA claims that nonfederal wind power producers should incorporate into their
contracts with third-party power recipients language that
absolves the generators from incurring penalties for failing to
deliver wind power due to forced curtailment. 136 This policy
places generators with contracts executed after March 6, 2012
at a competitive disadvantage and discriminates against them
in three ways: (1) their prices will be higher in order to
incorporate penalties derived from failing to deliver power due
to curtailment, (2) they might lose business due to the price
increases necessary to cover potential liabilities for failing to
deliver, or (3) they might have to simply cover these penalty
costs, resulting in diminished profits. 137 Non-federal
generators with contracts executed after implementation of

133. See id., Introduction ¶ (specifically referring to the definition of “Transmission
Provider”).
134. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78.
135. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b)(ii).
136. See BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 5.
137. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b)(ii); see also Wind Protest,
supra note 120, at 16–17.
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Oversupply Protocol P risk losing business and are at a
financial disadvantage compared to generators with contracts
that predate March 6, 2012, a problem created by the BPA’s
curtailment practice. The BPA’s new curtailment policy,
Oversupply Protocol P, is inherently unfair and so does not
comply with the requirements detailed in FERC’s order. 138
IV. IMPACT OF THE BPA’S CURTAILMENT POLICIES ON
WIND POWER PRODUCERS, QUALIFYING
UTILITIES, AND THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE ACT
The BPA claims that its Redispatch Policy did not affect a
customer’s transmission rights, 139 that it left transmission
service unaffected because the overall quantity of energy
delivered remained the same, 140 that it was merely a limitation
on the ability to generate power, 141 that it went to great
lengths to ensure wind generation was not affected, 142 and that
substitution of hydropower for wind power did not constitute
improper curtailment. 143 FERC’s order determining that the
Redispatch Policy was unfair, discriminatory, and preferential
towards BPA proved these statements incorrect. In response,
the BPA contends that its Oversupply Protocol P “complies
with the Commission’s [FERC] direction to provide comparable
transmission service.” 144 The BPA contends the policy is fair
because it compensates those affected by curtailment in an
equitable manner and represents a reasonable alignment of
costs and benefits. 145 Ultimately, the BPA believes the
proposal “satisfies the Commission’s [FERC] injunction to
provide fair and equitable solutions to the BPA’s oversupply
problem.” 146 Nevertheless, Oversupply Protocol P is a
continuation of the BPA’s curtailment program, posing very
138. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78; see also REDISPATCH POLICY,
supra note 7, at 25.
139. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 43.
140. Id. at 25.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 26, 43.
144. BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 11–12.
145. Id. at 12, 17.
146. Id. at 12–13.
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real, adverse impacts to the wind power industry, the ability
for Washington utility companies to meet RPS targets, and the
ability to achieve certain goals identified in the Energy
Independence Act.
A.

Impact on Wind Power Producers

BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P negatively impacts the wind
power industry in two ways. First, the policy hurts the ability
of wind power producers to transmit power reliably, affecting
their ability to satisfy contractual obligations made with
entities off-loading wind power. 147 Second, by continuing to
shut down wind power production and thus decreasing PTC
and REC payments, the policy’s Cost Allocation lessens wind
power producers’ economic viability that otherwise helps
promote the continued development of this green industry. 148
As capital costs for wind projects are high, these subsidies are
an important tool for spurring future growth and development
of the wind power industry.
For instance, between May 18, 2011 and June 13, 2011, the
BPA invoked its curtailment authority for “several hours
almost every day, curtailing more than 60,000 megawatt-hours
of wind generation,” while seizing the newly created
transmission capacity to deliver its own hydropower to
customers who had specifically contracted to receive wind
power. 149 Under Oversupply Protocol P, wind power producers
either receive no compensation for this lost output or receive
less than the actual value of the power produced as defined by
the terms of BPA’s fifty-fifty Cost Allocation. 150 The
147. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 3–4; see also REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7,
at 70 (noting that curtailment generally affects the ability to satisfy third-party
contracts).
148. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2.
149. Complaint, supra note 7, at 3. Several specific wind power facilities have been
hurt by the BPA’s Redispatch Policy: Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. (1300 megawatt
facility and purchases BPA services); PacifiCorp (two facilities and purchases BPA
services); NextEra Energy Resources, LLC (two facilities with total capacity of 115
megawatts and purchases BPA services); Invenergy Wind North America LLC
(interconnection agreements subject to redispatch); and Horizon Wind Energy LLC
(facilities with 300 megawatts interconnected to the BPA’s transmission service with
additional projects generating 900 megawatts under construction). See id. at 10–12.
150. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3. According to the BPA’s own
calculations, PTCs are valued at $21 per megawatt-hour while RECs range from $8 to
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curtailment of wind power under the BPA’s curtailment
program significantly impacts the profitability of wind power
producers.
Wind power producers within the BPA’s Balancing
Authority Area suffer adverse impacts from the BPA’s ability
to curtail their power; however, curtailment also affects utility
companies, who are unable to reliably obtain the wind power
they contracted to receive. 151
B.

Impact on Qualifying Washington Utilities

Although wind power producers directly suffer from the
BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P, curtailing wind power will also
adversely affect qualifying Washington utilities by reducing
the amount of eligible renewable resources available to comply
with RPS requirements and avoid stiff penalties.152 It is
important to note that not all of the seventeen qualifying
utility companies receive their eligible renewable resources
from generators impacted by the BPA’s curtailment program.
However, the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P will hurt those that
do. 153 Because wind power transmitted by the BPA is the
predominant eligible renewable resource in Washington, minor
or significant reductions to its availability will make it difficult
for utility companies to meet their RPS requirements.154

$20 per megawatt-hour. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 11. Using these
dollar amounts, one month of curtailment like what occurred between May and June
of 2011 would cost the wind power industry $1,260,000 in PTCs and anywhere from
$480,000–$1,200,000 in RECs. According to a peer-reviewed study conducted by the
BPA, the value of PTCs and RECs lost to curtailment could cost $50,000,000 in 2012
alone. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 20, 66.
151. Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
152. Id.; see also REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48, 64–65, 68. (noting initial
concerns by some qualifying utilities that curtailing wind power will inhibit their
ability to meet RPS targets). Failing to meet RPS targets results in a $50 fine per
megawatt-hour shortage, which can lead to steep penalties. See WASH. REV. CODE §
19.285.060 (2012).
153. See, e.g., AVISTA, supra note 62, at 5-1 to 5-5 (noting the extensive transmission
system Avista privately owns and controls, its predominant reliance on its own
generating sites for eligible renewable resources, and its minimal use of BPA’s
transmission system); CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITIES, supra note 62 at 9, 37, 46–49,
63–65, 74–75 (noting its extensive reliance on BPA’s generation and transmission
systems and expressing concerns about meeting RPS targets and uncertainty over the
existence of enough wind power to meet future RPS targets).
154. Id.; see also AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1 (noting that wind
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This will be especially true as RPS targets increase to
comprise fifteen percent of a utility company’s overall load. 155
If a utility is unable to meet its RPS target, it will be fined fifty
dollars for every megawatt-hour shortfall that occurs. 156 It is
important to note that the Energy Independence Act provides
utility companies a type of force majeur defense that excuses
noncompliance with the RPS requirements in certain
situations. 157 Under this provision, a qualifying utility will be
in compliance with the annual RPS targets if:
[E]vents beyond the reasonable control of the utility
that could not have been reasonably anticipated or
ameliorated prevented it from meeting the renewable
energy target. Such events include weather-related
damage, mechanical failure, strikes, lockouts, and
actions of a governmental authority that adversely
affect the generation, transmission, or distribution of an
eligible renewable resource under contract to a
qualifying utility. 158
This seemingly provides utilities with a way to avoid fines
by claiming that the BPA’s curtailment policy falls within the
meaning of an “event” as defined in the statute.
Key to this provision, however, is its insistence that the
events be “beyond the reasonable control of the utility” and
that they could not be “reasonably anticipated or
ameliorated.” 159 Two arguments against utilities using this
provision to avoid fines come to mind. First, by publishing its
Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA has
arguably notified both wind power producers connecting to its
transmission system and the utilities that obtain this power of
the possibility that this eligible renewable resource will be

power provides 4.6 percent of all Washington’s power); Washington Renewable
Electricity Profile, supra note 79, at tbl.1. See also Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2;
REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48, 68; Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶
63 (all referencing the difficulties utility companies will have if wind power
curtailment continues).
155. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2012); SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUB.
UTILITY DIST., 2010 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 49 (Aug. 17, 2010).
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.060(1) (2012).
157. Id. § 19.285.040(2)(i).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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curtailed throughout the year. Therefore, utilities would have
a hard time claiming that they could not anticipate potential
shortfalls in obtaining eligible resources necessary to meet the
statutorily-required RPS targets. 160 Second, having been put
on notice that curtailment will occur, utilities could look to
obtain eligible renewable resources from providers not
connected to the BPA’s transmission system and thus not
subject to Administration’s curtailment policies. 161 Therefore,
it would be difficult for utilities to claim that events leading to
noncompliance were out of their reasonable control.162 It is
difficult to imagine that the State would allow qualifying
utilities to utilize this defense to avoid fines and escape
compliance with RPS targets, which serve as the basis for
achieving the goals of the Energy Independence Act.
Turning to the fifty dollar per megawatt-hour penalty
provision, we can look at an example to put its significance into
perspective. Snohomish County Public Utility District (PUD) is
a qualifying utility under the Energy Independence Act. 163 In
2009, Snohomish PUD sold 6,872,796 megawatt-hours of
electricity. 164 In 2012, three percent of this total amount of
electricity was required to come from eligible renewable
resources, or, the equivalent of 206,183.08 megawatt-hours.
Under a worst case scenario (e.g. if Snohomish County PUD
obtained zero percent of its requirement) Snohomish County
PUD would be on the hook for $10,309,194. Although this is an
extreme scenario, this potential liability demonstrates the
potentially devastating impact a failure to meet RPS
requirements could have on a utility company. 165

160. Id.
161. For example, Avista, an investor-owned utility, generates eighty-five percent of
its own electricity from projects it owns, operates, and transmits itself. See AVISTA,
supra note 61, at 1. See also QUALIFYING UTILITIES’ REPORTED COMPLIANCE WITH I937’S 3% RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD FOR 2012, at 2, n.5 (Sept. 2012) (noting that
Puget Sound Energy listed five of its own wind projects as eligible renewable resources
to help meet the RPS target).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(i) (2012).
163. See QUALIFYING UTILITIES’ REPORTED COMPLIANCE WITH I-937’S 3%
RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD FOR 2012, supra note 161, at 2 (listing the seventeen
qualifying utilities and their reported compliance for 2012).
164. QUALIFYING WASHINGTON UTILITIES, supra note 60, at tbl.10 cell 9.
165. To put the $10,309,194 into perspective, Snohomish County PUD had revenues
of $512,094,000 in 2009. Therefore, $10,309,194 is equal to two percent of Snohomish
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A more realistic calculation to show the potential impact
that failing to meet RPS targets could have on a utility is as
follows: in 2020, Snohomish County PUD must obtain fifteen
percent of its electrical load from eligible renewable resources,
or the equivalent of 129.5 annual megawatts (the amount of
megawatts required per day for an entire year). 166 According to
Snohomish County PUD, it will fall 64.3 annual megawatts
short of achieving its 2020 RPS target. 167 When converted to
megawatt-hours, this shortfall equates to 1543.2 annual
megawatt-hours, or a total of 563,268 megawatt-hours a
year. 168 Under this scenario, Snohomish County PUD must
acquire an additional 563,268 megawatt-hours of power from
eligible renewable resources in order to comply with the RPS
targets for 2020. 169 A fifty dollar fine is imposed for every
megawatt-hour that Snohomish County PUD falls short of
meeting its RPS target, which equates to a potential maximum
fine of $28,163,400—a severe penalty for failing to meet RPS
requirements. 170
C.

Impact on Washington’s Energy Independence Act

Because the BPA sells nearly forty-five percent of all
electricity consumed in the Pacific Northwest and operates
more than 15,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines,
equivalent to eighty percent of the transmission network in the
Pacific Northwest, policies that curtail the generation and
transmission of eligible renewable resources adversely affect
producers, utility companies, and consumers alike. 171 If the
BPA forces renewable resource producers to stop producing
energy, those producers lose money. 172 If utility companies
County PUD’s total revenue for 2009. See SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUB. UTILITY DIST.,
supra note 155, at 51.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. To convert annual megawatt-hours into the total number of megawatts hours
in a year, multiply the annual megawatt hours—in this case 1543.2—by the days in a
calendar year.
169. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2012) (regarding electrical load
requirement for 2020).
170. See id. § 19.285.060(1) (regarding penalty amount).
171. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 12.
172. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 28–31, 48–49, 62–67 (noting, amongst
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cannot obtain enough eligible renewable resources to meet
RPS targets, they will be fined. 173 If utility companies are
penalized for noncompliance, then consumers will be hurt as
they will bear the brunt of the generators’ and utilities’ losses
through increased rates. 174 These trickle-down effects created
by the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P could compromise
achieving the goals articulated in the Energy Independence
Act and lead to significant changes to the statute.
1.

Implication for Achieving the Goals of the Energy
Independence Act

Broadly defined, the three main goals articulated in the
Energy Independence Act are to promote the development of
alternative renewable energy resources, increase the capacity
and use of local renewable energy resources, and develop a
green economy in Washington. 175 Achieving these goals will be
difficult if curtailment policies such as the BPA’s Oversupply
Protocol P continue to undermine the foundation for
accomplishing all three aims—the reliable generation and
transmission of eligible renewable resources like wind power.
To begin, the development of eligible renewable resources in
Washington will not continue if generators are unable to
transmit the power they produce. 176 Because the BPA controls
eighty percent of the transmission system in the Pacific
Northwest, 177 and because its curtailment policies create
discriminatory, inconsistent, and unreliable access to the
transmission grid, renewable power producers have no
incentive to operate existing facilities or build new ones. 178

other problems, that the curtailing energy will cost wind energy producers nearly
$50,000,000 in 2012 alone, that curtailing wind power costs these producers potential
revenue received for PTCs and RECs, and that curtailment does have a negative
economic impact on wind power producers).
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.060(1) (2012).
174. See Erik Smith, Ratepayers Paying Wind Farmers Not to Produce Electricity—
$2.7 Million So Far This Year, WASH. STATE WIRE (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://washingtonstatewire.com/blog/too-much-windpower-rivers-surged-this-summerand-oversupply-cost-2-7-million/.
175. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012).
176. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62; Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2.
177. Complaint, supra note 7, at 13.
178. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62; Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2;
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Therefore, the practical effect of the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol
P is to create “inefficient market operation and participation,
[a] loss of confidence in markets and market operations, [and]
disincentives
to
develop
renewable
generation”
in
Washington. 179 As many power companies and renewable
energy coalitions have suggested, the BPA’s curtailment
policies will “discourage the development of renewable
resources in the Pacific Northwest.” 180
Inconsistency in the reliable transmission of wind power
caused by curtailment will also stagnate the growth and use of
local renewable energy resources. For instance, wind power
producers, currently the State’s largest producers of eligible
renewable energy, 181 rely on PTCs and RECs to make
money. 182 To obtain these, wind facilities must generate
power, 183 which does not occur during curtailment because
facilities are forced to shut down. 184 By depriving wind power
producers of their major source of income and by creating
unreliable service conditions, 185 the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol
P discourages the development of new facilities in Washington
and encourages the development of new facilities in states not
impacted by such curtailment policies. This creates two
problems. First, wind power companies will not expand
development in Washington, so the use of local renewable
energy resources to satisfy Washington’s power demands will
level out. Second, Washington utility companies will be forced
to turn to out of state producers to obtain eligible renewable
resources required to meet RPS targets. Combined, these
effects contradict the goal of the Energy Independence Act of
securing Washington’s energy independence through the use of
local resources. 186

Complaint, supra note 7, at 34, 66; Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 63.
179. Complaint, supra note 7, at 66.
180. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62.
181. See Washington Renewable Electricity Profile, supra note 79, at tbl.1.
182. Complaint, supra note 7, at 3–4.
183. Id. at 13.
184. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2; OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12,
summary ¶.
185. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2–3.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012).
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Finally, as wind power facilities move elsewhere and plans
for future expansion and development within Washington are
scrapped, “green” jobs will disappear thwarting yet another
goal articulated in the Energy Independence Act. 187 The
Energy Independence Act states, “[m]aking the most of our
plentiful local resources will . . . provide economic benefits for
Washington counties and farmers, [and] create high-quality
jobs in Washington.” 188 The BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P
inhibits the development of a green economy in Washington
by: (1) reducing tax revenues that counties would receive from
the development of new wind facilities, (2) reducing the
amount of money local farmers would receive from leasing land
to the wind power producers to place turbines on their
property, and (3) reducing income that third parties would
receive for transporting, constructing, and maintaining
turbines and wind power facilities.
As addressed in comments made to the BPA by Community
Renewable Energy Association, Renewable Northwest Project,
Horizon Wind Energy LLC, Pacific Gas & Electric, and
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., BPA’s curtailment policies “will
lead to a decrease in new renewable energy projects and
economic development in rural communities.”189 Thus,
achieving a major goal expressed in the Energy Independence
Act will not occur and could force substantial changes to the
Energy Independence Act, which goes against the will of the
voters who passed Initiative 937 establishing the RPS targets
and fundamental goals codified in the Energy Independence
Act.
2.

Policy Implications for the Energy Independence Act

Achievement of the goals expressed in the Energy
Independence Act will be negatively impacted by the BPA’s
Oversupply Protocol P and could force the Washington

187. Id.
188. Id. See also AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2 (detailing the
economic benefits of wind power development in Washington); SIERRA CLUB:
WASHINGTON STATE CHAPTER, supra note 85 (noting that Initiative 937, codified as the
Energy Independence Act, has generated over $7 billion in renewable energy
investments in Washington).
189. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62.
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Legislature to change the requirements set forth in the
statute. The cause of potential change is simple: utility
companies that once supported the progressive standards 190
and the people who supported and voted for Initiative 937 191
will not support legislation that costs companies large sums of
money. Moreover, onetime supporters are unlikely to continue
to support legislation that creates unachievable RPS targets
and that hurts family income due to rate hikes to account for
penalties incurred for noncompliance and allocated costs
stemming from curtailment. 192 As a result, changes to the
Energy Independence Act might occur that would prohibit
achieving the goals stated in the original act. 193
If the Energy Independence Act was amended to make RPS
targets more achievable, there are three potential changes that
are more likely: (1) changing the definition of “eligible
renewable resources” to include hydropower, which is mostly
prohibited; (2) changing the RPS targets by either reducing the
percentage of eligible renewable resources that must make up
a utility’s electric load or by extending the dates for
implementing the requirements; and (3) adding strong
excusable noncompliance defenses for utility companies. Any of
these changes would negatively impact the goals articulated in
the Energy Independence Act and would be regressive actions
that hurt Washington’s energy independence.
For instance, changing the definition of “eligible renewable
resource” to include hydropower would diminish efforts to
diversify Washington’s energy portfolio through the

190. See Washington Energy Conservation, Initiative 937 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Washington_Energy_Conservation,_Initiative_93
7_(2006) (last visited June 8, 2013) (noting that many energy groups and
environmentalists, including the Washington Public Utility Districts Association,
supported the initiative’s passage).
191. See id. (noting that the bill passed with 61 percent of the vote and that many
local and State public officials endorsed the initiative).
192. See, e.g., Cowlitz PUD to Increase Electric Rates, THE REFLECTOR (Nov. 2, 2011,
9:00AM),
http://www.thereflector.com/news/article_df1e39f2-03ef-11e1-b377001cc4c03286.html?mode=story.
193. See Smith, supra note 174, at 3–4 (noting that bills in both the Washington
House and Senate were introduced in 2012 to change the terms of I-937, delay its
implementation, and “dial back” its conditions.). See also H.B. 2682, 62nd Leg. (Wash.
2012), S.B. 6418, 62nd Leg. (Wash. 2012) (proposed bills aimed at delaying the
implementation of I-937’s requirements).
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development of alternative renewable resources like wind
power. 194 This action would make meeting RPS targets an
easier task because hydropower currently accounts for seventy
percent of all power generated in Washington. There would be
no need or incentive to invest in and develop alternative
renewable resources necessary to diversify the State’s energy
portfolio. 195 This not only hurts the diversity of the State’s
energy resources, but it also impacts the development of a
“green” economy in Washington by decreasing incentives to
build new renewable resource facilities that satisfy the existing
definition of “eligible renewable resources.” 196 Because
hydropower is easily obtainable and the infrastructure for its
generation and transmission already exist (and are
predominantly controlled by the BPA) utility companies could
satisfy RPS targets with existing power resources. 197 There
would be no need to develop wind power facilities or other
currently eligible renewable resource options. A failure to do so
would hurt county tax revenues, decrease farmers’ income
from leasing land for turbine placement, and cut jobs
otherwise created for the construction, operation, and
maintenance of these facilities.
Adjusting the RPS targets with which utility companies
must comply would also adversely impact the State’s ability to
achieve the Energy Independence Act’s stated goals. For
example, decreasing the RPS targets hurts the development of
a “green” economy as there would be less need overall for
additional eligible renewable resources. This eliminates jobs
that would otherwise be required to construct the new facilities
and infrastructure necessary to accommodate the increase in
power generation. Not only does this hurt those directly
involved at all stages of the construction and operation
processes, but it also hurts county tax revenues and takes
money out of farmers’ pockets, as they would not receive lease
payments from the placement of turbines on their land.
Extending the dates for RPS target compliance would
similarly impact developing a “green” economy. First, power
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Smith, supra note 174.
MYERS, supra note 2, at 4–5.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(11), (20) (2012).
See Smith, supra note 174.
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producers that have already developed facilities in anticipation
of generating enough power to meet the needs of utilities and
under the existing implementation structure would lose their
investments. Second, procrastinating will leave alternative
renewable resource producers in limbo when deciding whether
to move forward with the construction of approved facilities,
whether to apply for permits to build future facilities, or to
increase production at existing facilities because it would be
unknown when additional resource capacity would be required.
Therefore, increasing the number of unknowns involved with
these already expensive “green” energy projects will further
slow the process, negatively impacting State revenues and the
development of a “green” economy in Washington.
Finally, an amendment to the Energy Independence Act
creating excusable noncompliance defenses for utility
companies that do not meet the RPS targets might be effective,
so long as it is stringent enough to dissuade illegitimate claims
by utilities. If written too broadly or too vaguely, such an
amendment could become a vast loophole that utilities use to
avoid complying with the RPS targets. The implications that
the BPA’s curtailment policies have on Washington’s Energy
Independence Act are significant. Whether directly making the
goals of the Energy Independence Act unachievable or forcing
changes to the act in order to make compliance possible, the
BPA’s current curtailment policy, Oversupply Protocol P,
threatens to defeat the will of Washington citizens who voted
to implement aggressive RPS targets in order to diversify the
State’s renewable resources, develop a “green” economy, and
provide the State with energy independence.198
V.

CONCLUSION

The BPA’s curtailment policies are inadequate approaches to
curbing the over-generation of power during times of high
water flow on the Columbia River. Both its Redispatch Policy
and Oversupply Protocol P fail to address the problem in a way
that satisfies FERC’s demand that the BPA provide fair,
comparable, and nondiscriminatory access to its transmission

198. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012).
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system. 199 However, other remedies exist that the BPA could
pursue in order to address its over-generation problem without
curtailing wind power production in a manner that runs
counter to FERC’s requirements.
Of the potential remedies, five are notable: (1) supporting
dam removal on the Columbia River to free up transmission
capacity that could then be filled with increased wind power
generation; 200 (2) supporting efforts to increase State
mandated TDG levels, thereby allowing additional water to be
spilled over the tops of dams during high flow events; 201 (3)
increasing its water storage capacity through aquifer
replenishment and pumped storage mechanisms; 202 (4)
upgrading and expanding its transmission system to allow for
more energy to be placed on the system at any given time and
to accommodate the continued growth of the wind power
industry; 203 and (5) implementing a fair compensation
mechanism that compensates wind power producers for the
actual amount of money lost during curtailment periods. Some
of these proposals are more feasible than others, yet all are
legitimate alternatives to the BPA’s current curtailment policy,
Oversupply Protocol P, that continues to preference BPA
hydropower and provides wind power producers with unfair,

199. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78.
200. See Associated Press, Wind Power Briefly Exceeds Northwest Hydro Power,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2012,
7:09
AM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019509822_apornorthwestwindpower.htm
(showing that enough wind power is generated to fill diminished capacity that would
result from dam removal); AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1 (noting that
Washington wind power can currently supply sixty-four percent of the State’s energy
needs); SAVE OUR WILD SALMON, REVENUE STREAM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REMOVING THE FOUR DAMS ON THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER 8–9
(2009),
http://www.wildsalmon.org/images/stories/PDFs/revenuestream8.pdf
(discussing how dam removal will not inhibit the ability to meet power needs).
201. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 5–6.
202. See BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 14–16 (noting that
aquifer replenishment could eventually be an option if feasible aquifers are presented
to the BPA; additionally, pumped storage is viable and would continue to be
researched by BPA as an option to address its over generation problem).
203. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 35; Press Release, Bonneville
Power Admin., Wind Power on BPA System Sets Another New Record: The Renewable
Resources
Passes
4000
Megawatts
(Mar.
22,
2012,
12:00
AM),
http://www.bpa.gov/news/newsroom/Pages/Wind-power-on-BPA-system-sets-anothernew-record.aspx.
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discriminatory transmission service. 204
Although the above actions are feasible alternatives to the
BPA’s current curtailment policy, some are more viable than
others. For instance, dam removal is extremely expensive, time
consuming, and requires action by Congress, which is unlikely
given today’s political climate. 205 Aquifer replenishment and
pumped storage would also require political action and
potential sites must be identified, evaluated, and prepared for
such a large project with environmental implications of its
own. However, the other alternatives—supporting efforts to
increase Washington’s maximum TDG level, investing in
upgrades to its transmission system, and implementing a fair
compensation mechanism that fully compensates wind power
producers affected by continued curtailment—are reasonable
positions that would help solve the BPA’s over-generation and
discriminatory transmission system access problems.
A.

Support Efforts to Increase Washington’s Maximum TDG
Level

States set TDG levels that limit BPA’s ability to spill water
over the tops of dams, as required by the Clean Water Act. 206
Currently, Washington’s maximum TDG level is lower than
Oregon’s by five percent. 207 To avoid problems stemming from
the differing standards, the BPA operates the FCRPS in
accordance with Washington’s lower level. 208 However,
environmental groups and government agencies contend that
Washington’s limits are too low and that higher TDG levels
would benefit endangered fish species and reduce the amount
of power that the BPA must curtail during high water

204. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 3.
205. It is interesting to note that wind power could provide the energy necessary to
account for the lost production from removed dams as wind power output recently
exceeded the amount of hydropower generated and transmitted on BPA’s transmission
system for the first time. See Wind Power Briefly Exceeds Northwest Hydro, supra note
200. Moreover, a recent resource assessment conducted by the National Renewable
Energy Lab estimates that Washington wind power could provide sixty-four percent of
the State’s current energy needs. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1.
206. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 4.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 5.
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events. 209 In fact, a study conducted by the BPA shows that a
higher TDG standard would reduce the need to curtail wind
power “by between twenty-five and 100 megawatt months,”
which is the equivalent of “six to seventeen percent less
displacement of wind energy than under the lower TDG
standard.” 210 Conservation groups like Save Our Salmon and
American Rivers recently petitioned Washington’s Department
of Ecology and the State Legislature to increase the State’s
maximum TDG standard to equal Oregon’s, which would allow
the BPA to spill additional water and limit its curtailment
practices. 211 Increased spillage has even garnered the support
of Judge Redden, an Oregon Federal District Court Judge
overseeing the Columbia River BiOp process, who has ordered
the BPA several times to spill excess water over its dams, even
at the expense of hitting maximum TDG levels, in order to
comply with the BPA’s obligations under the Endangered
Species Act. 212
However, the BPA opposed these groups’ efforts, even
though Oregon’s higher standard represents best available
science and would allow the BPA to curtail less wind power. 213
Supporting the effort to increase Washington’s TDG standard
is a cost-effective and efficient way to reduce the BPA’s
reliance on curtailment policies admonished by FERC while
still fulfilling its environmental obligation to protect
endangered fish. In the future, the BPA should collaborate
with these conservation groups’ lobbying efforts to change
Washington’s maximum allowable TDG level to at least equal
Oregon’s.

209. Id.
210. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA AND FISH PASSAGE CENTER STUDY EFFECTS
OF CHANGING TOTAL DISSOLVED GAS STANDARDS 2 (Apr. 2011).
211. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 5.
212. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No.
CV 01-640-RE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29509, (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005); Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, et. al., v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No. CV 01-640-RE, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38010, (D. Or. May 23, 2007); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al., v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 2011).
213. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No. CV 01640-RE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29509, 4–5 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005).
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B.

Upgrade and Expand the BPA’s Transmission System
Capacity

The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act
(FCRTS) requires the BPA to provide sufficient transmission
capacity within its Balancing Authority Area. 214 Specifically,
the FCRTS requires the BPA to “operate and maintain the
Federal transmission system within the Pacific Northwest
and . . . construct improvements, betterments, and additions to
and replacements of such system,” as are necessary to
“integrate and transmit the electric power from existing or
additional Federal or non-Federal generating units.” 215
Currently,
the
BPA’s
transmission
system
cannot
accommodate all of its own federally generated hydropower
during high flow events, let alone accept current and future
non-federal generated wind power, leading to the
implementation of its curtailment policies. 216 The failure to
operate a transmission system with sufficient capacity to
accept this power contradicts the BPA’s obligations under the
FCRTS requiring it to “integrate and transmit” power from
“existing or additional Federal or non-Federal generating
units.” 217 It also conflicts with statements made by the Obama
Administration, which noted that the Department of Energy
will require Power Marketing Administrations, like the BPA,
to take steps to upgrade the transmission grid in order to
better incorporate renewable energies such as wind power.218
Nevertheless, the BPA continues to contract with wind
power producers to accept additional capacity onto its already
stressed system. 219 By the end of 2013, the BPA expects to

214. See generally Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974, 16
U.S.C. § 838b (2006).
215. Id. § 838b, b(a) (emphasis added).
216. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 3–6.
217. 16 U.S.C. § 838b(a) (2006).
218. See Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 11; see also Letter from Steven Chu to
Bonneville
Power
Administration
(March
16,
2012),
available
at
http://energy.gov/downloads/memorandum-secretary-chu-power-marketingadminstrations-role-march-16-2012.
219. See 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 14; see also BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., TRANSMISSION SERVICES, PLANNING & PROJECTS, WIND PROJECTS: CURRENT
WIND PROJECTS, http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/ (page last modified Oct.
26, 2012).
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have 5000 megawatts 220 of wind power connected to its
transmission system, which will increase to over 7000
megawatts by 2017. 221 The BPA does not have the sufficient
capacity on its transmission system to deliver this power
reliably. The Administration should abide by the mandates set
forth in the FCRTS to construct “improvements, betterments,
and additions,” necessary to “integrate and transmit” the wind
power it has already contracted to transmit in addition to the
future wind power projects the BPA plans to integrate into its
transmission system. 222
The BPA is beginning to invest in transmission system
upgrades to expand capacity in order to support wind power
integration through several recent projects: (1) two 500-kilovolt
power lines that will offer 3000 megawatts of transmission
service to wind power producers; 223 (2) the new Central Ferry
Substation located in Garfield County in southeast
Washington, which connects Puget Sound Energy’s 343
megawatt Lower Snake River Wind Project to the BPA’s
transmission system; 224 and (3) upgrades to high power
transmission lines that run to California. 225 Although an
improvement, these projects provide nowhere near enough
increased transmission capacity to accommodate existing and
future wind power in Washington. The BPA must continue to
invest heavily in upgrades to its transmission system.
Although transmission system upgrades are expensive, the
BPA does have outlets available to help defray transmission
system upgrade costs, most notably the Northwest Power Act
(NWPA). Section 7(g) of the NWPA allows the BPA to recover
costs associated with its fish and wildlife protection obligations
through adjustments to existing rates. 226 In addition, the BPA

220. Press Release, supra note 203, at 1.
221. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., Forecast of Renewable Projects Connected to BPA
Grid
based
on
Existing
Queue
and
Recent
Trends,
BPA.GOV
http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/documents/Renewable_Forecast_Graph_20
17.pdf (Oct. 1, 2012).
222. 16 U.S.C. §§ 838b, b(a), 838d.
223. Press Release, supra note 203, at 2.
224. Id.
225. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 4.
226. See generally Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
§ 7(g), 16 U.S.C. § 839e, (1994). See also Wind Protest, supra note 119, at 17–18.
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is entitled to a credit against its obligation to repay the
Federal Government for expenditures made protecting fish and
wildlife, 227 countering the Administration’s argument
defending its need to implement curtailment programs like the
Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P. Rather than
continue curtailment, the FCRTS and NWPA provide the BPA
with valid options it can pursue to meet its fish and wildlife
protection obligations, fulfill its duty to provide sufficient
transmission capacity for federal and non-federal power
sources, and comply with FERC’s order demanding the BPA
provide fair, comparable, and non-preferential access to its
transmission system.
C.

Implement a Fair Compensation Mechanism for Ongoing
Curtailment Practices

Curtailing wind power will always be controversial and will
continue to attract the ire of the renewable energy industry. 228
However, the BPA could quell opposition to ongoing or future
curtailment policies by wholly compensating renewable energy
generators for their displaced power. For instance, Oversupply
Protocol P, without its accompanying fifty-fifty Cost Allocation,
provides relatively fair compensation for wind power
producers’ lost production during curtailment. By paying these
generators for the actual amount of RECs and PTCs lost, a
majority of revenue is recouped. In addition, the BPA should
reimburse all wind power producers for penalty costs incurred
for failing to deliver power during curtailment. Moreover, the
BPA must compensate facilities for any physical or operational
losses caused by a forced shut down. Finally, and most
importantly, the BPA should not implement a cost-sharing
mechanism that equally allocates curtailment costs between
the BPA and those entities whose energy it forcibly displaces.
Instead, the BPA must allocate costs based on a true costcausation basis and pay generators for the amount of power
that would have been placed on the transmission system, but
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Wind Protest, supra note 119; Complaint, supra note 7; Comments of
Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Ass’n and Electric Power Supply Ass’n
in Support of Complaint, Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No.
EL11-44-000 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, July 19, 2011).
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for curtailment. Conversely, the BPA could simply incur the
costs for its curtailment policy and aggressively seek to recoup
these expenses under section 7(g) of the NWPA.
Oversupply Protocol P is a discriminatory curtailment policy
that fails to address the major concern articulated in FERC’s
order—that the BPA discriminates against non-federal power
producers by giving federal hydropower preferential
treatment. 229 Oversupply Protocol P, which continues to curtail
non-federal wind power, merely perpetuates the BPA’s
previous Redispatch Policy that was explicitly invalidated by
FERC. 230 The BPA’s continued reliance on discriminatory
actions directed at non-federal wind power producers is
especially troublesome considering that alternative actions
exist that would negate the need to curtail wind power. To
comply with FERC’s order, the BPA must stop curtailing nonfederal wind power and implement alternative programs to
deal with its problem of excess hydropower generation during
high water flow events.

229. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78.
230. Id.
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